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Conflict, repression and resistance had an alienating effect on a micro- and macro-
level in apartheid South Africa. This brings to mind Hendrik Willem van der 
Merwe as a person who united South Africa’s enemies. This article explores auto-
ethnographic insights in a discussion of his approach to mediation, involvement 
with the Centre for Intergroup Studies and his establishing of the South African 
Association for Conflict Intervention (SAACI). His approach differed from others 
at the time such as the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA). The value 
of his work is noted and further research advised. The article suggests that scholarly 
activism (or the activist scholar) is again needed to build peace and justice in the 
context of South Africa and our continent.
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Afrika gehad. Hendrik W van der Merwe is in die media beskryf as die man wat Suid-
Afrikaanse vyande bymekaar bring. In hierdie verkenning word gebruik gemaak 
van kwalitatiewe auto-etnografiese momente om Van der Merwe se benadering 
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Sociologists seem to veer towards politics, for instance H F Ver-woerd and Fatima Meer. Two Afrikaans sociologists noted for their consistent opposition to the apartheid ideology and its 
structural outcomes were the late Frederik Van Zyl Slabbert and 
Hendrik W van der Merwe.
H W van der Merwe (HW) is a well-known name in academic 
circles and, in particular, in conflict resolution. Perhaps not so well 
known to the current South African public is the fact that he played 
a major role in mediation, conflict resolution and communication 
between political adversaries during the apartheid era in order to 
facilitate a more just society. He fulfilled this role despite the state’s 
attempts at erecting iron barriers between the citizens of South Af-
rica. In addition to his academic interest he took an active part in 
micro and macro South African communities and played the role 
of facilitator between the exiled African National Congress (ANC) 
leadership, other internal liberation movements and the apartheid 
government., Many recognised and respected his involvement in 
communities in KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape.
This article highlights HW’s work, his approach to communica-
tion, conflict resolution, mediation, intervention and the outcomes 
thereof. In a conflict-ridden South Africa, he married academic in-
volvement with facilitating consistent communication, mediation 
and practical conflict resolution over an extended period, some-
thing very few South African academics can lay claim to. The article 
also contrasts HW’s approach to other organisations active at the 
time, such as the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDA-
SA), and ventures into an appreciation of his work within the South 
African context.
While Slabbert and Van der Merwe involved themselves in re-
sisting the apartheid rule by different means, many academics at 
Afrikaans- and English-speaking universities remained aloof of the 
debilitating conflict and social disruption in South Africa. South Af-
rican academics frequently preferred to only study these conflict sit-
uations and to comment or write about them. An entire vocabulary 
boasted terms such as “objective”, “neutral”, “non-partisan”, “not 
emotional”, “rational”, “independent” and “realistic”. This “we-do-
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not-want-to-be-involved” language acrobatics took place within a 
society perceived by the majority of South Africans as unjust and 
socially destructive. Such an attitude amounted to a mere acceptance 
of the ruling order, or even its desirability, and (subtle) justification 
of oppression and this is in stark contrast with the work of Slabbert 
and Van der Merwe.
Van der Merwe’s persistent and personal involvement, as opposed 
to the mere study of conflict, deserves reflection. It is my view that 
now is perhaps the appropriate time to do so as it is a decade since 
HW died on his farm near Bonnievale in the Western Cape.
1. Aim
The article addresses the role and involvement of HW van der 
Merwe with the Centre for Intergroup Studies (CIS) and the 
establishment of the South African Association for Conflict 
Intervention (SAACI). Comparisons between the work of the 
Centre, its intentions and examples of practical outcomes and an 
activist pro-democracy group such as the Institute for Democracy 
in South Africa (IDASA), are relevant. The article concludes with 
an appraisal of Van der Merwe’s work and some pointers for future 
reference. The author’s personal experiences inform the article 
with some auto-ethnographic moments.1
2. Methodology
The qualitative method is used with elements of description, 
comparison and auto-ethnography. Literature on HW and his 
involvement in conflict resolution in South Africa forms part of 
the material consulted. His autobiography deserves attention. 
1 I served as a part-time worker for the Centre for Intergroup Studies (CIS) dur-
ing 1985/1986 and 1991, and as secretary of the South African Association for 
Conflict Intervention (SAACI) from 1987 to 1988, the latter closely aligned 
with the CIS. Serving as organiser, consultant and later Director Research 
for the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) between Novem-
ber 1986 and December 1990 forms part of the personal background to this 
study.
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Primary sources were limited to documents available at the 
University of Cape Town (UCT) archives and related documents 
in my possession through personal involvement with the CIS. 
Other documentation relating to the South African Association 
for Conflict Management (SAACM), which later became the 
South African Association for Conflict Intervention (SAACI), is 
also consulted. My involvement as a periodical worker between 
1985 and 1991 and thus participant, observer-participant and at 
times participant-observer at the Centre feeds into this narrative. 
Articles published by HW in the Afrikaans and English media, 
and notes kept during the period while I acted as SAACI secretary, 
were also relevant.
Comparative elements are limited to the Institute for Democracy 
in South Africa (IDASA). Established by Drs Frederik Van Zyl Slab-
bert and Alex Boraine after their resignation from the Tri-cameral 
Parliament in 1986, IDASA opted for biased intervention through 
advocacy of democracy. IDASA by design aimed to popularise the 
notion of a negotiated transition by bringing together the then per-
ceived main political contenders, the National Party (NP) and the 
African National Congress (ANC), while to a large extent excluding 
other internal stakeholders.
Van der Merwe’s memoir, Peacemaking in South Africa: a life in con-
flict resolution (2000), was written in an auto-ethnographic style. The 
strength of this style is that it provides a collage to context and expe-
rience at a particular moment in time (cf Bryman 2004: 301, 315, El-
lis & Bochner 2000: 733-4, 739, Schwandt 2001: 13). Some criticise 
the auto-ethnographic approach for being limited and authors not 
well disposed to auto-ethnographic approaches may argue that it is 
“personalistic”; however, qualitative inquiry has brought together 
various moments in the research path (cf Denzin & Lincoln 1994 
& 2000). Despite criticism against it, the auto-ethnographic angle 
adds value to other research approaches and complements available 
data while contextualising it in human and personal experience. 
Auto-ethnography as a qualitative research angle provides a 
view, rich in data about an era, personal experiences and observations 
in a particular context. It throws a unique light on socio-political 
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developments and outcomes.2 For me it is an optic angle worth de-
ploying, in particular to contemporary South African socio-political 
experiences and the role of a practitioner-sociologist such as HW 
van der Merwe.
Deploying the “I” of the researcher or author as one tool in the 
warehouse of research tools, the approach cannot claim objectivity, 
but rather tends towards rich description. The journey or travel as 
theoretical enterprise thus embodies dialogue, intersubjectivity 
rather than static “objectivities”.3 The appeal to intersubjectiv-
ity invites dialogue, rather than unqualified advocacy, openness to 
communication, a willingness to mediate, and intervention without 
prescription – a tall order for any individual in a deeply divided 
society – but this was, incidentally, exactly what HW and Slabbert 
undertook, albeit on different levels.
While the article attempts to carefully highlight some of the 
activities and achievements of Van der Merwe as a “sociologist in ac-
tion” dedicated to the practical resolution of conflict, further studies 
are necessary to provide a more comprehensive picture.4 Interviews 
with those in close interaction with Van der Merwe – community 
members, peers, fellow researchers, family members and past politi-
cal actors – could be valuable. These omissions are per se limitations 
to this article.
No personal action takes place in a vacuum. Van der Merwe’s role 
relates closely to conflict and South Africa’s political dynamics under 
the apartheid rule. The example set by him and other actively com-
mitted social scientists in dealing with conflict in a deeply divided 
society provides useful space for research that could enhance future 
2 Cf Blenkinssop 2006, Crang & Cook 2007: 13, Etherington 2006: 141, Jos-
selson et al 2003, Philaterou & Allen 2006: 65, 67.
3 Cf Ellis & Bochner 2000: 739, 1996 & 2006: 439, Schurink 2006: 4, Schwandt 
2001: 13.
4 The same applies to the late Van Zyl Slabbert whose career and activities pro-
vide a rich area for future research. In addition to various formal academic pub-
lications, two of his books reflect the auto-ethnographic style, namely The last 
White parliament (Slabbert 1985) and The other side of history (Slabbert 2006). 
The Afrikaans translation of the latter is Duskant die geskiedenis: ’n persoonlike 
terugblik op die politieke oorgang in Suid-Afrika (Tafelberg/Jonathan Ball).
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contributions towards meaningful conflict intervention by social 
scientists. As such, these deserve further research.
3. Terminology and concepts
Persons trying to understand conflict and simultaneously 
react meaningfully to ensure a relatively peaceful community, 
equality and economic justice within their context have options 
other than violence against the incumbent order. These options 
are possible even while tension mounts, alienation increases 
and political disagreement cascades into violent confrontation. 
One qualification being that in a revolutionary atmosphere, the 
application of such options (and the concepts discussed in this 
instance) would have decreasing value as alienation and social 
conflict, including (mass) violence, escalate.
In discussing terminology, I stand by the definitions used by HW 
van der Merwe. Given the context of conflict in South Africa at the 
time, I steer away from post-1996 definitions or variations of defini-
tions of the terms discussed in this instance and the glib if generic 
definitions found in less reliable Wikipedia-type sources. I do so 
because it is important to understand the involvement of a person or 
persons in their historic context with the theoretical tools available 
and applied by them at the time.
3.1  Facilitation
Facilitation may pave the way for mediation and ultimately enable 
a settlement, but it needs to be distinguished from negotiation, 
mediation and intervention. Facilitators are not interested in 
prescribing solutions or in acting out the formal role of mediator. 
They are concerned with opening channels for communication. 
The facilitator appears to be functional rather than committed 
to a (specific) model of resolution of a conflict (Van der Merwe 
1991: 14). For Van der Merwe facilitation calls for quiet, informal 
services of people not employed by governments but frequently 
with the knowledge of the conflicting parties. Such an approach 
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contrasts with a more public role such as the one played by 
IDASA.
3.2 Mediation
Mediation is an informal process in which the third party tries 
to bring the conflicting parties together by lowering tensions, 
improving communication, interpreting issues, providing 
technical assistance, exploring potential solutions and generating 
a settlement, either informally or by means of formal mediation 
(Van der Merwe 1990: 224-5 & 1991: 12-3). Mediators will 
not cease in attempts to mediate if tensions remain the same or 
increase. Mediation stands in contrast to negotiation through 
the involvement of a mediator aiming to enable an acceptable 
temporary or lasting agreement (Nieuwmeijer 1986: 42). Van 
der Merwe (1990a: 9) points out that mediation and negotiation 
relate but they are “two different activities”. Mediation refers 
to “intervention without force in a dispute by an acceptable, 
impartial and ‘neutral’ third party to assist contending parties” 
to reach a mutually acceptable settlement or truce (Van der 
Merwe 1990: 9).
In summary, mediation is a process of dispute resolution as an al-
ternative to other means where a third party (usually viewed as neu-
tral or non-partisan) assists in reaching an agreement on perceived 
common interests. In the case of HW facilitation of communication 
and mediation played a pertinent role depending on the context, and 
it remained part of a consistent activity on a sliding scale without 
losing the aim of achieving justice and equality.
3.3 Third-party intervention
Third-party interventions can be neutral or biased. The 
distinctions between such definitions depend on the morality of 
the intervener, powers in conflict and the envisioned end goal, 
which in itself may lay on a spectrum of minimising violence, 
managing conflict and re-communicating common agreement.
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Van der Merwe distinguishes between neutral intervention and 
biased intervention: “The purpose of neutral intervention is usually 
to mediate between conflicting parties, to improve communication 
and to promote a negotiated settlement” (Van der Merwe 1991: 11). 
He contrasts neutral intervention with partisan intervention, where 
reasons impel the intervener to advocate the cause of (a perceived 
weaker) party or to assist such party to protect or achieve the desired 
conditions fruitful to a settlement (Van der Merwe 1991: 11).
Biased intervention will favour the party perceived to be weaker 
within the specific context. In this sense, biased intervention is con-
textual and variable, however, not devoid of morality. Biased in-
tervention frequently aims at achieving relative equality between 
contenders and opponents; in other words, levelling the playing field 
or strengthening a weaker centre of power. This is done so that the 
(previously) dominant power finds itself drawn to a peaceful settle-
ment rather than a violent confrontation. The latter is applicable 
to contenders aiming at increased revolutionary violence or incum-
bents bent on maintaining an authoritarian or oppressive system. 
Admittedly, biased interveners may misread situations, aim con-
sciously to achieve more than reality dictates, and realise that the 
path between conflict and a negotiated settlement does not lead to 
final solutions. At this point, neutral interveners, biased interveners 
and communication facilitators are likely to agree, depending on 
similar experience or context and the definition of how to facilitate, 
manage or resolve conflict. The reason is simply that human inter-
action when turned into destructive conflict has to be managed in 
order to achieve a better world for those damaged or injured by the 
conflict – be it micro or macro. HW’s approach was more neutral or 
at most subtly biased towards the disadvantaged parties depending 
on the context. By contrast, the public image of IDASA was one of 
biased intervention.
3.4 Negotiation
Negotiation implies an extended process whereby contending 
parties come to an agreement or solve a conflict. Negotiation must 
be distinguished from mediation (where a third party facilitates 
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an agreement) and intervention, and from arbitration, where a 
legalised third party, the arbitrator, takes a decision binding on 
two conflicting parties (Nieuwmeijer 1986: 42). Lobbying as a 
way to advocate one’s point of view, while it may form part of 
negotiation, is not to be equated with negotiation. Both or all of 
the conflicting parties may use their ability to lobby, even while 
negotiating.
4. A politics of conflict in pre-democratic  
South Africa
Those who decided to facilitate an end to apartheid faced serious 
obstacles. Historical background is necessary in this instance in 
order to highlight these challenges.
Organised peaceful resistance among politically marginalised 
South Africans can be traced back to 1884 and the establishment 
of the South African Native National Congress in 1912, two years 
before the National Party came into being (Odendaal 1984). Various 
organisations made the first attempts at organisational level to “na-
tionalise” the struggle for political liberation. During the inter-war 
years, peaceful resistance and political activity among black people 
and socialists (the Communist Party of South Africa [CPSA] and sev-
eral Trotskyite groups) toned down, partly because of the economic 
recession of the 1930s (Hirson 1994: 65). Inactivity within bodies 
such as the Industrial Commercial Union (ICU) related to the dark 
years of depression and differences on strategy. Another restraint on 
political activities was that “bread-and-butter” became prominent 
issues on the political agendas of various parties. The Second World 
War also had a dampening effect.
The Second World War saw the Smuts government in South Afri-
ca siding with Britain, France and the US (where a New Deal of State 
intervention in the economy just took place). Ipso facto the Smuts 
government also sided with the Soviet Union, a proclaimed commu-
nist state, in the war against Nazi extremism and racial exclusivity. 
Under such conditions, resistance against the Smuts government 
would have been tantamount to support for the Nazi cause – or at 
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least would allow for the local Nazi-orientated forces and sympathis-
ers to exploit the situation. In South Africa, some Afrikaner nation-
alist groups, such as Lang Hans van Rensburg’s Ossewa Brandwag and 
the New Order Party headed by Oswald Pirow, a former Minister 
of Defence, and the Grey Shirt Movement had open sympathy with 
national socialism. South African activist Robey Leibrandt returned 
clandestinely from Germany, hoping to establish an authoritarian 
state. The National Party (established in 1914) reflected sympathy 
with these groups despite some political disagreements. Then like 
now, South African politics were complex and conflict lies frequently 
under the surface often close to boiling point.
The National Party came to power in 1948 with the political 
slogan of apartheid (“separateness”), later to become a full-fledged 
ideology. Apartheid legislation permeated South African life. Segre-
gation was not new, but under National Party Prime Ministers such 
as D F Malan, H Strijdom and H F Verwoerd, waves of expanding 
legislation influenced individual and community existence on na-
tional, provincial and local government levels, making inroads into 
people’s social and private lives. Ironically, this ideology had strong 
advocates in people with a sociology background, such as Geoffrey 
Cronjé, professor in sociology at the University of Pretoria and Hen-
drik Verwoerd, the first head of the Department of Sociology at the 
University of Stellenbosch, despite the fact that not everyone ac-
cepted these thoughts and their structural outcomes.
Political developments in the 1950s affected South African po-
litical dynamics. Since the Passive Resistance Campaign, govern-
ment repression escalated. The Klip Town Declaration resulted in 
the Freedom Charter (June 1955), which further heightened ten-
sions between the apartheid government and its contenders (Lieben-
berg 1990: 92). Government reaction against civic action (refer to it 
as a “civil rights movement”, if you wish) ultimately culminated in 
the banning of the African National Congress (ANC), the Pan Afri-
canist Congress (PAC), the South African Congress of Trade Unions 
(SACTU) and others (Liebenberg 1990: 92, 96).
During the 1950s, there was only a fractional manifestation 
of what Ted Hondenrich (1976) would have called “violence for 
Liebenberg/Sociology in practice
11
equality”. The South African “condition” at the time was also not 
resembling what Schurmann (1971) would have called a “revolu-
tionary conflict”:
We made it abundantly clear long before the campaign was 
launched that it was a system, not a race that we were opposing 
[… the] target of the campaign was unjust oppressive laws. The 
intention was to disobey these laws, suffering arrest, assault and 
penalty if need be without violence (Luthuli 1962: 105).
Overturning a system of systematic oppression with violence 
or without compromise was not on the agenda. In essence, the 
campaign’s basis was the claim for human dignity (Liebenberg 
1990: 92).
It appears that South Africa’s political history and squandered 
opportunities for peacemaking go hand in hand. The Defiance Cam-
paign, the Congress Alliance and the release of the Freedom Charter 
at Klip Town in 1955 did not succeed in bringing this message 
into the corridors of white power. Organisations advocating freedom 
and equality were harassed. For example, the Congress of Demo-
crats (COD) and the Liberal Party suffered under banning orders of 
members and continued harassment from the Security Police (Van 
der Westhuizen 1994). The liberation movements increasingly em-
barked on violent resistance to apartheid and the state it represented. 
Activities by followers of Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe in the 1960s 
– much denied today by the governing elite – played an important 
role in defining the future contest for power.
The ANC embarked on an armed struggle in the 1960s, which 
by 1988 proved to be relatively ineffective. Internal dissatisfaction 
and international pressure played a more important role. Support for 
and from the exiles in Britain and the US and the armed strugglers, 
however, played a role in creating the context for the negotiated set-
tlement that was to come. In reality, “internal” South Africans of all 
races resisting apartheid since the 1950s progressively deactivated 
apartheid as a social system. The inevitability of economic inter-
dependence and cooperation played a part in upsetting top-down 
racial impositions. So did the work done by HW and others such 
as Slabbert.
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Small liberation movements/initiatives, apart from the PAC and 
ANC, some predominantly workerist in orientation, others pre-
dominantly white African in composition, played a role. Contri-
butions currently conveniently dropped from the social radar – if 
not denied, one may add. The resistance embarked upon by smaller 
groups, in cases, bordered on the farcical, for instance by a hopeful 
yet naïve sabotage campaign waged by people not skilled in guerrilla 
warfare (Du Toit 1994). Names that come to mind are for example 
the Armed Resistance Movement (ARM). Trotskyite trade unions 
played a role (cf Liebenberg et al 1994: 52, 65, 72, 81, 96, 164, 173, 
Van der Westhuizen 1994a & 1994b).
The 1960s were to see acts of resistance from the PAC. Black 
Consciousness as a social movement became influential in the 1970s. 
Currently mostly youthful supporters of the ANC incidentally un-
derplay the roles enacted by these organisations. In turn, the mi-
nority government steeling itself against the “winds of change” in 
Africa embarked on increasingly stronger measures. The situation 
gradually changed from what Philip Frankel called the “politics of 
police control” under Prime Minister B J Vorster, to that of a techno-
cratic praetorian state under the executive presidency of P W Botha 
(Frankel 1984). This transition from a policing state (inclusive of the 
Bureau of State Security [BOSS]) to a technocratic and militarised 
state underpinned by security forces accelerated after the 1972 Natal 
strikes and the 1976 Soweto revolt.
H W van der Merwe and others found themselves in this strained 
context: political and economic paradigms increasingly became al-
ienated and gradually drifted towards increasing civil conflict.
Reaction by the government resulted in more bannings and 
restrictions. The Christian Institute headed by Reverend Beyers 
Naudé and its newsletter Pro Veritate, newspapers such as The World 
and the Rand Daily Mail became the victims of government repres-
sion. Detention became a popular tool to disarm “agitation”. Be-
cause of detention and concomitant torture, Steve Biko and Neil 
Agget and others were to die. The Natal-based activist philosopher, 
Richard Turner, among others, was assassinated. The Wits academ-
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ic, Webster, would follow the same route, being a victim of the Civil 
Cooperation Bureau (CCB).
In addition, white communities felt the tightening security 
screw, even if subtle. At Afrikaans universities, such as Stellen-
bosch, a university loyal to the Nationalist Government, persons 
associated with the Christian Institute found themselves isolated 
and ostracised. Some examples in this instance would be the Catholic 
theologian Albert Nolan, Andre du Toit (philosopher and political 
scientist) and Johannes Degenaar (philosopher). In circles such as the 
Dutch Reformed Church (DRC), which showed loyalty towards the 
apartheid government, those who criticised apartheid policies were 
ostracised. Stellenbosch theologians such as Willie Jonker and, later, 
Nico Smith, serve as examples. At the northern universities, persons 
such as Ben Marais, theologian, and Willem Kleynhans, political 
scientist, suffered the same fate.
It is not surprising that H W van der Merwe together with oth-
ers such as David Welsh started asking questions about the fate and 
future of the (white) universities in South(ern) Africa. An example 
is a work on the future of the university in the region edited by 
HW and Welsh (1977) with contributions by Shils, Halsey, Blake, 
Vann Woodward, Wandira, Murphree, Degenaar, Bozzoli, Hun-
nings, Bhana, Kgware and others. The questions posed in this work 
in some cases went beyond verligtheid or liberal discomfort. The work 
addressed the heart of an unjust educational and elitist system. It 
may help to contextualise the above by referring to a statement by 
Steve Biko: 
There are those whites who will completely disclaim responsibil-
ity for the country’s inhumanity towards the black man. These are 
people governed by logic for four and a half years but by fear at 
election time. The Nationalist Party has perhaps many more Eng-
lish votes than one imagines […] Their (the white people) state 
of insecurity, however, does not outweigh their greed for power 
and wealth, hence they brace themselves to react against this rage 
rather than to dispel it with open-mindedness and fair play (Stubbs 
1988: 90).
Biko is correct: without referring to race or language, the greed 
for power and wealth remains, and one does not yet find open-
Acta Academica 2011: 43(1)
14
mindedness, ubuntu, principled non-racialism and equality in 
post-apartheid South Africa. Some, however, lived and acted 
transformatory openness then and now, regardless of their colour 
or class. One such person was HW.
The mentality described by Bantu Biko above was lived by 
many conservative (verkrampte) and enlightened (verligte) Afrikan-
ers as well as English-speaking liberals. Facing such ambiguities, if 
not outright pro status quo advocacy in favour of an oppressive state, 
committed engagement became a moral imperative for citizens and 
academic practitioners whether at universities or not.5
5.  Early years
Born on a farm near Bonnievale, HW returned to South Africa 
in 1951 after a spell at a missionary station in Rhodesia (now 
Zimbabwe) and studied at Stellenbosch. Through the Contact 
Study Group (Kontakstudiegroep), where Jan Loubser and Dian 
Joubert were involved, he came to know Pieter Philander, Adam 
Small and Dick van der Ross. His interaction with Dr Erica 
Theron, who tirelessly worked for the upliftment of disadvantaged 
communities, significantly influenced his later work (Van der 
Merwe 2000: 26-7).
HW mentions three academics at Stellenbosch who influenced 
his “dissent”, and the kairos where Afrikaner became African (Van 
der Merwe 2000: 26, 30). They were Professors B B (Ben) Keet of 
the Theological Faculty, S P Cilliers (Sociology) and Johan Degenaar 
(Philosophy, later head to a separate department, the Department of 
Political Philosophy). The elders at Stellenbosch found themselves 
uncomfortable with future theology students being exposed to De-
genaar and his colleagues, since the Kweekskool as an Afrikaner in-
stitution’s notion of philosophical grounding was more oriented to-
5 The complexity of making existential choices against apartheid, given the 
mobilisation of white society and a repressive state, is well summed up by Van 
Zyl Slabbert in his last media interview: “All I had to fall back on was my own 
conviction. I went ahead” (Monare 2010: 10).
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wards (Christian) hermeneutics rather than the radical questioning 
of issues, including the prevalent racialist political structures.
Many students for years afterwards would concur with HW about 
the role of these academics and their like (in my case, Johan Degenaar 
and Andre du Toit, in particular, and later at the University of West-
ern Cape, Andrew Nash and Pieter le Roux – the latter two work-
ing within different academic paradigms). Through contact with 
other racial groups, HW became interested in facilitating contact 
and dialogue among South Africans. He also mentions his research 
paper on the coloured community near Piketberg that kindled an 
interest in applied sociology and him being elected as chairperson 
of the Stellenbosch Sociological Society (Van der Merwe 2000: 26, 
32). His growing interest in applied sociology would lead to a life of 
mediation in conflict and frequently deployed in conjunction with 
facilitating dialogue between estranged groups in a divided society. 
In 1958 HW and his wife Marietjie departed to study in the US 
at UCLA.
The exposure to University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) 
and the Quaker Movement became life-transforming experiences for 
HW before his return to South Africa. After serving at Rhodes Uni-
versity, he set off to head the Abe Bailey Institute at the University 
of Cape Town, later to become the Centre for Intergroup Studies and 
later known as the Centre for Conflict Resolution.
6.  The Centre for Intergroup Studies
The Centre for Intergroup Studies (CIS), based in Rondebosch, 
Cape Town and registered as the Abe Bailey Institute of Inter-
Racial Studies Limited, did not have shared capital. Situated at 
the University of Cape Town, it was not part of the university 
and did not receive government funding. UCT did provide 
partial funding from non-government sources. Funding among 
others came from the Carnegie Corporation, the Joseph Rowntree 
Charitable Trust, the Cadbury Trust, and the Algemeen Diakonaal 
Bureau in the Netherlands, Anglo-American, De Beers and a 
small Quaker Trust (CIS 1985: 1). Other sponsors (reported by 
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1991) were Johannesburg Consolidated Investments, Liberty 
Life Foundation, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (Germany), the 
Chairman’s Fund of Anglo-America and De Beers, South African 
Breweries and the Embassies of Canada, Germany and the US 
(CIS 1991: 6).
CIS initially maintained a rather low profile, yet ceaselessly 
worked toward constructive dialogue and the exposure of differ-
ent or opposing views. This happened on various levels, bringing 
together students, community leaders, religious demagogues and 
career-politicians in various meetings on local, regional and national 
level. These activities included meetings between Black Conscious 
Movement (BCM) members, white left-leaning students and gov-
ernment supporters during the 1970s and the apartheid government 
and the ANC-in-exile before 1990 (CIS 1985: 7-8). In Natal the 
director of CIS played an important role in mediating between con-
flicting groups (Centre for Intergroup Studies 1985: 9).
The work done by the Centre, however committed, was a drop in a 
growing ocean of alienation and increasingly violent communal con-
flict. The dynamics of reform, repression and resistance (liberation 
politics itself demonstrating levels of liberatory intolerance versus 
authoritarian practices) became dangerously destructive. The 1980s 
saw increasing militarisation, an ideology of repression softened by 
verligte discourse while alienation – if not outright resistance – by 
communities countrywide increased. The tri-cameral parliament, 
an experiment in cooptation of so-called coloured and Indian com-
munities, while maintaining white control under an executive presi-
dent, faltered amidst national and international resistance. In 1986 
Van Zyl Slabbert resigned, calling the entire tri-cameral parliament 
a sham. Together with another parliamentarian, Alex Boraine, who 
also resigned, Slabbert established the Institute for Democracy in 
South Africa (IDASA).
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6.1 Academia, conflict resolution and social involve-
ment: SAACM and SAACI
In 1986 the Conflict and Peace Studies Working Group (CAPS) 
started transforming itself into the South African Association 
for Conflict Management (SAACM). In July 1986, at the third 
session of the CAPS Working Group (to coincide with the 17th 
Annual Congress of the Association for Sociology in Southern 
Africa [ASSA] at the University of Natal in Durban), CAPS 
held its first “own” conference (CIS 1986). It was entitled the 
First National Conference on Negotiation and Mediation in 
Community and Political Conflict. Various people, among whom 
Paul Wahrhaftig of the Conflict Resolution Centre in Pittsburgh 
and Elaine Burgess of the University of North Carolina, delivered 
papers. South Africans addressed various issues. Gerald Pillay, a 
theologian, spoke eloquently and passionately on “ideological 
and historical prisons” and the need to escape from it while Ian 
McCallum, psychologist and ex-Springbok rugby player, shared 
his views on individual conflict and social consequences. Peter 
Gastrow and Pierre Cronjé (then PFP members) spoke on the 
Hambanathi Project (a self-empowerment and reconstruction from 
“below” in Natal); Mary de Haas delivered a paper on conflict in 
Natal; Renate Winkler made a contribution on the churches and 
peace/justice initiatives; Yunus Carrim on consumer boycotts and 
unions, and Attie van der Merwe on mediation paradigms. At 
the request of HW van der Merwe, I delivered a paper on police-
community relations (or rather the lack thereof) in the Western 
Cape. Other papers were delivered by Loet Douwes Dekker, 
University of Witwatersrand, J Rieckert from the Independent 
Mediation Services of South Africa (IMMSA), Prof Hilstan Watts, 
Georgina Stevens (Black Sash) and Rowley Arenstein (CIS 1986).
Members at the conference elected a steering committee to pre-
pare for the envisaged national association on conflict intervention. 
The members of the steering committee were Prof Ampie Muller 
(chairperson), Mr Loet Douwes Dekker (vice-chair), with the Rev-
erend Athol Jennings and Mr A W van der Merwe as additional 
members, and I as secretary. Preparation for the establishment of the 
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Association was slow. The majority of the members were involved 
in various other fields.
In 1988, the Second National Conference on Negotiation and 
Mediation in Community and Political Conflict, in conjunction 
with the fourth session of the CAPS Working Group, took place 
simultaneously with the nineteenth ASSA congress of South Africa 
at the University of Durban-Westville. At the end of the conference, 
the first annual meeting of the SAACM took place and the first Na-
tional Council was elected. The name, South African Association for 
Conflict Intervention (SAACI), was accepted. Chairpersonship was 
shared by HW and Jannie Malan. A F Allen was the elected secretary 
and additional members were Simon Bekker, A Jennings, Ampie 
Muller, A J van der Merwe, A Zikalala, C D Kekana, F Horowitz, 
Gavin Bradshaw, S Colin and L Douwes Dekker.6 During the draft-
ing process of the constitution, the word “management” in the name 
of the association was replaced by “intervention”, the reason being 
that the concept “management” had negative connotations with 
power, as is currently still the case.
CIS served as the national secretariat for SAACI. A membership 
drive followed. In 1989, public launches of SAACI took place in 
Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, Durban and Soweto. This coincided 
with a series of national training courses in Mediation and Conflict 
Intervention (Maci).
6.2 A philosophy and praxis of peaceful but committed 
engagement
The philosophy underpinning HW’s approach was engagement, 
active involvement, facilitating communication and dialogue, 
mediation and intervention in justice-building and peace-creation 
without compromising structural and individual injustice. The 
main focus was to enable clear communication on as many levels 
and as consistently as possible.
6 During this meeting I was in The Netherlands for further research and ten-
dered my resignation as secretary towards the end of 1987. On my return from 
the Netherlands in July 1988 I joined IDASA full time. After my resignation 
from IDASA in 1990 I took up contact with SAACI again for a short while.
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Unequal access to power remained a persistent debilitating phe-
nomenon in South Africa. Partisan intervention had a role to play 
to equalise the opposing forces. However, HW’s approach went fur-
ther, or was perhaps more holistic. In order to equalise the balance 
of power between the incumbent apartheid government and the 
contending liberation forces, a need arose for the facilitation of com-
munication and mediation on various levels. Partisan intervention 
as a means was recognised and various bodies engaged in it. How-
ever, HW realised the need for facilitation of communication and 
mediation corollary to this, and that biased intervention would be of 
a temporary nature when measured against a settlement that would 
empower social justice in the longer term. Faced with the political 
dynamics of an increasing authoritarian state and resistance, this 
would prove to be no easy task. 
South African political developments in the 1970s and 1980s are 
analogous to a runaway truck: one calamity cascaded onto another 
in nearly predictable succession. Excessive dependence on securo-
cratic rule underpinned by increasing security legislation furthered 
tensions. This led to a cycle of violence that was spiralling out of 
control. Contestation surrounded concepts such as “justice”, “the 
law” and “legality”. People asked questions about the role of legal 
order and the role of the judiciary in South Africa (cf in this regard 
Dugard 1978, Mathews 1986). HW and others engaged in this de-
bate as described in Van der Merwe & Hund (1986). In the Western 
Cape, people opposed to apartheid laws that destabilised and up-
rooted communities rhetorically asked: “Whose law? God’s law or 
man’s law?” In the Western Cape, the Unity Movement and New 
Unity Movement were for some time active in resisting apartheid. 
Nationwide organisations such as Black Sash and others were in-
volved in stemming the tide of apartheid uprootings. The National 
Forum (NF), established at the same time as the United Democratic 
Front (UDF), insisted once more on a revolution of workers with-
out sacrificing origin, language and non-racialism, the intellectual 
roots of the NF often misunderstood (and misrepresented) by oth-
ers. At the time, numerous other initiatives sprung up, such as the 
End Conscription Campaign (ECC) and the Five Freedoms Forum 
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(FFF). Even in a relatively isolated pro-government university town 
such as Stellenbosch, Dutch Reformed Church student members 
in the 1980s militated against apartheid against the wishes of their 
church leadership and concerned – if not disconcerted – academic 
patriarchs.
Dutch Reformed Church students – among them myself, Dirk 
Louw, Abraham (Braam) Olivier, Hans Müller, George van Niekerk, 
Irene Malherbe, Ari Bouwer and Lizl Kruger – started an organi-
sation called Action for Social Justice (Aksie Sosiale Geregtigheid). 
Letitia Pople, a well-known contemporary Afrikaans journalist, 
also played an important role in the organisation. The DRC student 
church newspaper Dinamiek with Lizl Kruger and Irene Malherbe 
asked penetrating questions about minority rule disguised as a new 
deal, until status quo supporters took control of the newspaper in 
1987. The questions asked by apartheid critics, a new quo vadis at 
a university that was supposed to enact the Afrikaner ideal, were 
uncomfortable (“Stellenbosch staan vir ’n idee”, one has to remem-
ber). A National Union of South African Students (NUSAS) branch 
and the Black Students’ Organisation came into being, followed by 
the opening of an Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South 
Africa (IDASA) office. Egbert (Egbie) Nel, an ex-Matie then study-
ing at the University of the Western Cape, and I opened the IDASA 
Stellenbosch office and immediately became involved together with 
existing groups in organising various activities which did not meet 
general approval in the verligte/conservative Stellenbosch environ-
ment, as can be expected (oorbeligtheid and more radical activities 
equalled crime thought in the small world of the Stellenbosch elite) 
(cf Itterbek 1984). We partook in a consumer boycott, criticised the 
role of the South African Defence Force in Namibia and Angola (and 
at home), wrote against conscription and asked critical questions 
about the role of the Chaplain Services in the South African Defence 
Force; neither these nor our opposition to Verligtheid and activities 
on campus were welcomed.7 The United Stellenbosch Front (USF) 
7 The mutations, trials and tribulations of “left” politics in Stellenbosch be-
tween 1970 and 1989 are in itself a worthwhile study. Time and space prevent 
me from discussing the range of activities of the IDASA office in Stellenbosch 
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followed, its launch marked by keynote speakers, Frederik van Zyl 
Slabbert and Alan Boesak. On- and off-campus nearly fifteen organi-
sations affiliated to the USF. 
The Nederduits Gereformeerde Sendingkerk (NGSK), reserved for so-
called people of colour, was to declare a status confessionis. The Belhar 
Confession (Belhar Belydenis) denounced apartheid in all forms and 
declared its prophetic mission to strive for God’s justice for all (I 
still vividly remember the day when Frederik Nel, a close friend of 
mine studying at UWC, Neels Theron, myself and others signed the 
Belydenis). All of this seemingly had a negligible impact on the apart-
heid state. The South African Council of Churches (SACC) found 
their head offices bombed. SACC staff members such as Joe Ser-
emane and Tom Manthata found themselves detained and tortured. 
Others, such as Frans Kekana, detained previously, had to skip the 
country to avoid detention and possibly torture.
By the 1980s, the locus of state decision-making had shifted away 
from the white parliament with police assistance in case of disorder 
towards the State President and the State Security Council (SSC – in 
Afrikaans Staatsveiligheidsraad) banking on military support. The 
tri-cameral era demonstrated that instead of “reform”, South Africa 
was nearing the abyss of increasing repression, growing community 
conflict and even the potential Libanonisation of conflict. Centrali-
sation of power marked the polis, not the devolution of power, as 
the government wanted its gullible followers to believe. Third-force 
operations (or covert action) aggravated the situation. For some, the 
country was nearing “the death of politics” and the limitations of 
pseudo-reform became apparent (cf Omar 1988).8 Mediators had 
to do their work under such circumstances. Despite this there was 
never respite or even favourable conditions for HW or anyone who 
chose this approach. 
By the time that white liberals became disillusioned with parlia-
ment in the 1980s, HW had been active for years in a facilitating 
role. He brought contending ideologues and political opponents 
during 1987.
8 Cf Schutte et al (1998) for more detail on covert operations by the state against 
political opponents.
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together to facilitate freer communication. His attempt was to in-
tervene by means of dialogue and an individual attempt at “third-
track” diplomacy. The CIS was recognised for its consistent attempts 
at intervention on local and national levels. At a micro-level, HW 
personally intervened in the Western Cape during the re-settle-
ment of “non-white” South Africans by the apartheid regime in the 
1970s/1980s. It was, taking into consideration the terminology 
above, yet re-defined within context, I suggest, an existential biased 
intervention; intervention on the side of the weak and to-be-homeless. 
HW was not the only one to do so in the Western Cape. I recall Jaap 
du Rand (University of the Western Cape) who acted by individual 
choice as a biased intervener, while playing a role as mediator and 
facilitator during the turmoil of the 1980s, among others, on the 
volatile University of the Western Cape (UWC) campus. Jannie Ma-
lan and Ampie Muller at UWC also deserve mentioning. There were 
others at the time, whose detailed roles cannot be discussed in this 
instance.
It is necessary to mention in this instance, in order to provide con-
text, that as early as 1968 the Liberal Party (LP) disbanded itself fol-
lowing the “political interference act” (the Prohibition of Political 
Interference Act, No 51 of 1968). The Liberal Party evolved from the 
Liberal Association, with some of whose members HW maintained 
contact long after the LP had disappeared. The self-dissolution of the 
Liberal Party was perhaps prophetic: 
After 1961 the government viewed liberalism and the LP as the 
greatest threat to its policy. Its campaign against the LP began 
to move beyond propaganda: in March Patrick Duncan was the 
first member to be banned from the political scene […] Bannings 
followed with monotonous regularity: Joe Nkatlo in April 1961, 
Peter Hjul in and Randolph Vigne in February 1963, Jordan Ngu-
bane three months later […] Eddy Roux was forced to resign from 
the LP because as a ‘listed communist’ he could no longer take part 
in any political activity (Van der Westhuizen 1994b: 91). 
Van der Westhuizen (1994b: 93) sums up the demise of the 
Liberal Party and committed liberalism in South Africa: 
Later there were white politicians – such as Tian van der Merwe, 
Van Zyl Slabbert, Jan van Eck, Pierre Cronje, Molly Blackburn and 
perhaps even Helen Suzman – who thought the way the Liberal 
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Party of the 1960s did. But there was never again a white-controlled 
party that fought under the banner of true liberalism for the unconditional 
freedom of all South Africa’s inhabitants. All hope for that was buried 
with the LP in May 1968 [my italics, L] 
The United Party (UP), in itself only moderately progressive, dis-
integrated and was absorbed into the Progressive Federal Party 
(PFP) with strong links in the business world. The New Republic 
Party (NRP), not vaguely as critical of the Nationalist regime as 
the LP, appeared, made little impact and was soon to disappear 
from the political scene.
7. IDASA
By 1986, white liberals (to the extent that they still existed in 
the National Party-dominated tri-cameral parliament) became 
increasingly disillusioned. Van Zyl Slabbert, leader of the white 
opposition party, the Progressive Federal Party (PFP), resigned 
from parliament. Alex Boraine followed. They established the 
Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) that same year. 
On hearing about the intention to establish IDASA (then not 
yet having a formal name for the to-be institute), I approached 
Slabbert. I received a phone call some days later and by December 
1986 I joined a fledgling IDASA.
One of IDASA’s first public actions was to arrange a meeting 
between South Africans (mostly Afrikaans-speaking, although not 
necessarily “white”) and members of the ANC in Dakar, Senegal, 
facilitated by Madame Mitterand’s Humanities Français, Breyten 
Breytenbach, an exiled Afrikaans poet, Slabbert and President Ab-
doe Diouf of Senegal. The meeting was widely publicised and con-
doned by supporters of the liberation struggle. Pres P W Botha, 
Magnus Malan, the Afrikaans media (for example Beeld, Die Burger, 
Volksblad and Rapport)9 and top government officials castigated the 
Dakar safari and Dakargangers. At the then Jan Smuts airport, a 
group of discontented AWB supporters and one of their leaders 
9 The Citizen, a pro government English newspaper, likewise fulminated against 
the Dakar exercise.
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threatened violence on the return of this group. Despite Dakar at-
tendees’ pleas to meet with them face-to-face, police took the arrivals 
out of the airport as if the Dakar attendees were afraid of one-on-
one confrontation with the AWB. The meeting raised the political 
profile of IDASA and assisted it by playing an advocacy role for a 
democratic alternative for South Africa. Many regarded IDASA as 
being partial to the ANC, while HW continued his active involve-
ment by approaching conflict and remedial action towards justice 
in his own way.
Through partisan intervention, IDASA focused predominantly 
on the ANC. IDASA and its supporters did not meet with other 
exiled organisations such as the Pan Africanist Congress and exiled 
Black Consciousness groupings, for example, AZANLA (Azanian 
National Liberation Army). The institute did not include other 
strugglers, such as the National Forum (NF), in its activities, except 
for a conference in Stellenbosch organised by the Stellenbosch office 
of IDASA. Neville Alexander was one of the keynote speakers at this 
conference. IDASA’s focus on the ANC and UDF created an impres-
sion that other (smaller) liberation organisations were less relevant. 
In this sense, impartiality was lost in the process (public rumours, 
the pro-government media and disinformation by security bodies 
contributed to this, I have to add).
IDASA played an advocacy role. The idea was to make a public 
intervention and influence the future political course in South Africa 
by introducing an atmosphere suitable for a negotiated settlement. 
It was a directed attempt to influence the public and ruling govern-
ment to steer away from authoritarian politics and embrace transi-
tion to non-racial democracy. It was a valuable partisan intervention 
at the time, and needed to be so as the country was nearing the point 
of unending social conflict. The Institute assisted in facilitating 
communication between incumbents and contenders and through 
IDASA’s activities added to a much-needed pressure for transition 
toward a democracy. However, IDASA could not mediate from neu-
tral ground due to existing perceptions at the time. Moreover, given 
its activities and deliberate public profile, IDASA could not escape 
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the label of a biased intervener. CIS under HW’s directorship and 
SAACI took the less public and more inclusive route.
8.  SAACI in action
SAACI described its role as “A public, voluntary association 
of interested people [… aiming at] the establishment of an 
autonomous body for mediation”. HW would later sum it up:
The time has come for the establishment of such a professional me-
diation service, which would ideally consist of community leaders 
viewed with sufficient credibility by a broad spectrum of society. 
They will have to be trained and organized professionally (Van der 
Merwe 1990: 1).
CIS continued in co-operation with the Quaker community 
to recruit and train people. In 1990, a National Workshop on 
Negotiation and Mediation in Community and Political Conflict 
took place in Johannesburg. The fourth SAACI conference that 
coincided with a national workshop in Bellville in the Western 
Cape soon took place. In 1992, the fifth SAACI conference fol-
lowed. The theme, “Conflict Resolution in Societies in Transition 
with Special Reference to South Africa”, drew attention to 
transition and changing power relations, but also to the need 
for continued intervention and mediation. Until 1999, annual 
conferences focused on relevant issues. The membership of SAACI, 
given the challenges, remained rather low.10 In a polarised society 
not all people are drawn to neutral intervention. Many people 
chose partisan intervention, with good reason.
Large numbers of membership was not necessarily the aim, but 
rather to acquire skills and commitment. This may tie in closely 
with HW’s philosophy about peace-making and intervention as set 
10 In 1989, membership amounted to 89 people. By 1990, the association saw a 
rapid increase to 135 members. SAACI membership slowly dropped from over 
90 to 38 by 1997. Perhaps a sign of some optimism about the perceived drop 
in levels of political tension in the South African community played a role. 
The prevalent transition rhetoric may also have contributed to an early wave of 
optimism that underestimated the still existing political and class cleavages, 
which were to remain, and still remain – more so increase - at the moment.
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out in numerous publications at the time. The idea was to create an 
institution of “volunteers and interested (read: ‘committed’) people” 
that would enable “neutral (in contrast to partisan) intervention” (cf 
again Van der Merwe 1990: 1). Van der Merwe (1989) argued already 
in the late 1980s for a national body of professional people that could 
assist in mediation, conflict management and creative mediators.
9. A philosophy of biased intervention evolves
Other organisations existed at the time in the field of political 
intervention, mediation or advocacy of democracy, some (not 
all) of them openly activist in nature. Noticeable examples were 
groups based in the business world, such as the Independent 
Mediation Service of South Africa (IMSSA), ICWIM (an inter-
church movement in which the Rev (Dominee) Willie Cilliers 
[NG Kerk in Afrika], Dale White from Wilgespruit Centre and 
the Rev Stanley Ntwasa played an important role), Black Sash 
and others. Other organisations were MERGE, Koinonia and the 
Consultative Business Movement (CBM). More joined the fray, 
some as facilitators of communication, others as biased interveners 
or democracy-advocating groups, while others still attempted 
mediation.
Many were either taking side in the struggle for liberation, such 
as the Institute for Contextual Theology (ICT), die Belydende Kring, 
Students for Christian Action (SUCA), the National Union of South 
African Students (NUSAS), the End Conscription Campaign, or 
became involved in partisan intervention or the advocating of de-
mocracy. Christian organisations often openly took the side of the 
oppressed and their liberation movements. For them the issue was 
principled justice and equality (not equity), solidarity with the mar-
ginalised, the poor and the oppressed. The Christians who took to re-
sistance differed on one issue, without labelling the others as wrong 
or “misled”. Consensus existed that the time and context demanded 
an existential choice or kairos (moment of truth), which demanded 
action. Many objected consciously to apartheid military service. In 
my immediate circle Frederik Benjamin Nel, Neels Theron and 
Liebenberg/Sociology in practice
27
Koos van der Riet followed that route. At the time the CIS facili-
tated support groups and furthered academic studies in the field. 
I became involved with the Alternative National Service debate, 
and CIS facilitated a conference in this regard. The 1980s brought 
no easy choices. Some chose to resist apartheid structures without 
recourse to violence; others argued that violence may (have to) form 
part of a just struggle against oppression. 
New political movements (call them social movements, if you 
like) were established, such as the United Democratic Front (UDF), 
the National Forum (NF), the Congress of South African Trade Un-
ions (COSATU), the Congress of South African Writers (COSAW), 
and others. Organisations such as Jews for Justice, Five Freedoms, 
Koinonia, the Galileans (Western Cape), and others ceaselessly ad-
vocated the turn to a democratic constitution. Today few of these are 
remembered, or rather honoured, by the new incumbents to power 
who act as if the ANC single-handedly inaugurated the 1996 Con-
stitution of South Africa.
The fine line was to be able to facilitate in a neutral (unbiased) 
manner while aiming at creative interventions. The aim was simply 
to facilitate free communication and at the same time remain neu-
tral. Yet, simultaneously, it required principled adherence to the 
common core of humanity. With these as qualifiers, mediation could 
follow. This was a tall order in the 1980s. Important aspects became 
clear. Neutral and unbiased intervention was not to work as long as 
one party (the National Party) had the upper hand. An approach was 
needed which would empower the weaker actor to enable negotia-
tion on an equal footing.
For some it became a time for biased or selective intervention. 
IDASA, as an advocate for democracy and a negotiated transition, 
chose this role in contrast to HW’s approach.
In dealing with conflict, the to-be mediator often consciously 
takes a stand in favour of the weaker agent, the argument being 
simply that there is no even ground or equal terms on which the 
stronger incumbent and the weaker contender could negotiate or 
meet. Compare, for example, how banned community organisations 
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or restricted attempts to “talk to government” are limited by secu-
rity regulations or state action (detentions, assassinations, and so 
on). One can also compare a banned or exiled movement or their 
leadership’s power relative to the apartheid state, or a minority of 
any ethnic or linguistic group or class marginalised attempting to 
speak to the leadership of dominant party in a country. They may 
indeed succeed in this. In reality, in a deeply divided society, this 
may amount to little but media exposure for the ruling elite. In 
conditions such as these, the intervener may take a biased position. 
The role is still to facilitate, but the neutrality of the facilitator is 
compromised towards the weaker partner. There are risks in this 
instace, but if the facilitator is open and honest about this interven-
tion and acts with integrity, it may assist in getting the conflicting 
parties together.
HW subtly did this by developing an approach where the weaker 
party was empowered through contact and communication and at 
the same time channels of communication with the stronger party 
(the state or incumbent) were kept open or even widened.11 The no-
tion of biased intervention should not be confused with advocacy 
or canvassing support for the contender. The bias lies in empower-
ing the contender within view of the coming process of negotia-
tion, not supporting the contender to win power. This distinction 
is important.
At the same time Van der Merwe’s views were anchored in politi-
cal realism:
The political climate in South Africa is not favourable to concepts 
such as mediation and negotiation […] Negotiation should not be 
seen as a substitute for other pressures which are required to bring 
about change in South Africa. The two processes of negotiation 
and coercion is not mutually exclusive […] the promotion of a just 
11 Retrospectively, in 2000 HW remarked: “I continue to side with the weak, the 
poor, the minority” (Van der Merwe 2000: 220).
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society in South Africa cannot be isolated in the long run from the 
task of peacemaking and conciliation (Van der Merwe 1988: 29).
10. Comparing different approaches
As a high-profiled institution IDASA did facilitate and intervene 
directly. It further opened dialogue and communication. Through 
public action, IDASA forced the issue of a negotiated settlement as 
prerequisite for transition from authoritarian rule to democracy.12 
IDASA intervened consciously so as a biased entity. The institute 
openly lobbied with all forums for a negotiated settlement years 
after Chief Albert Luthuli had called for a national convention 
and the PFP had suggested a national meeting or convention for 
political contenders on the constitutional future of the country. In 
the end IDASA was viewed as too much of an advocacy-orientated 
organisation and could not overcome the public image of bias 
towards the ANC, and the government-supporting media and 
cohorts consciously contributed to this.
However, there were positive spin-offs in IDASA’s approach: nu-
merous meetings exposed opposing political opponents, the notion 
of a democratic alternative became popularised, and the idea of a 
negotiated settlement eventually injected into the South African 
political discourse. Meetings outside the country served the same 
purpose, while also involving foreign actors.13
12 This did not happen without risks though. Apart from public slander and 
constant observation by security agencies two IDASA staff members were 
killed and others detained. Offices were broken into and in one case shot at. 
Staffers received death threats on various occasions. Others were denied jobs 
when applying for it. In at least one case a Dakar conference attendee, not 
even an IDASA staff member, Trudie de Ridder, was fired from her post as an 
educator. 
13 Internal parliamentary politics were also discussed. In 1988 I led a small group 
of political scientists, parliamentarians and journalists to Harare to meet with 
Frontline State observers and exiles to discuss parliamentary politics. I remem-
ber Barry Streek, a prominent journalist, James Selfe and the political scientist, 
Willem van Vuuren being part of the group. Representatives from Frontline 
States, African embassies and exiles such as Moletsi Mbeki and Steve Tswete 
attended the meeting hosted by the Cold Comfort Farm Trust. On a critical 
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Because of parallel but not related activities such as HW and 
IDASA, the ANC and the incumbent government came to what 
Luthuli pleaded for in the 1950s a negotiated settlement and a na-
tional convention of sorts.14
The price, for IDASA in this venture, was a loss of neutrality – 
whether by design or default or simply as result of runaway political 
dynamics.
The task of serious neutral intervention in terms of conflict re-
mained for smaller, lower profiled and committed people such as 
HW van der Merwe, CIS and SAACI. The role of SAACI was useful. 
Its overall success, in retrospect, is perhaps more difficult to evalu-
ate. The association at least succeeded in raising awareness about 
the need for neutral intervention. It did play a consistent role at 
various levels with regard to intervention and mediation. If memory 
serves me well, HW was mentioned in an opinion poll of Leader-
ship SA15 readers as one of the South Africans who did most to assist 
reconciliation and preparation for a political changeover/transition 
to democracy by means of negotiation. Others named were Frederik 
van Zyl Slabbert, Thabo Mbeki, Archbishop Desmond Tutu and 
Oscar Dhlomo.
Through various conferences, national workshops and training 
courses, SAACI played its role. The role played by the Centre for 
Intergroup Studies (CIS) and SAACI should not only be regarded 
in the light of these achievements. The example was set for a body 
of professional people to be deployed in similar situations inside 
and outside South Africa. Moreover, the people who participated in 
SAACI also lived out their commitments in other social arenas.
note, it is interesting that lately – and somewhat opportunistic – more than 
but a few then verligtes and ex-members of National Intelligence claim in the 
Afrikaans media that they in fact created the conditions for a negotiated settle-
ment, even as early facilitators of communication while consistently resisting 
any such earlier moves by their peers.
14 At a much earlier stage Pixley Ka Itsaka Seme proposed to opponents and 
friends alike an equal society devoid of the malice of racism and ethnicity (cf 
Liebenberg 1990: 84, Odendaal 1984: 8). Whether the “new” ANC post-1999 
still adheres to principled equality and non-racialism is another debate.
15 Despite a search for this source, I could not lay a hand on it.
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First CIS and later SAACI and its members focused their atten-
tion on the need for mediation, neutral intervention and “second-
track diplomacy”. Many of these ideas found their way into broader 
society. Such activities set an example for institutions such as the 
Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) 
or NGOs (such as the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution 
of Conflicts, ACCORD) and the Centre for the Study and Prevention 
of Violence (CSVR).
The activities of members and associates articulated various 
issues. For example, Ampie Muller and Jannie Malan designed a 
course on conflict resolution to be implemented at UWC and other 
interested universities, dealing with the relations between the po-
lice and local communities, torture in detention and community-
based mediation empowerment. Subsequently Malan and Muller re-
mained active in the world of conflict resolution. Other areas deserve 
attention. CIS presented a workshop in 1986 at UCT that dealt with 
contending ideologies (paper by Ampie Muller), police community 
relations (paper by Liebenberg) and the phenomenon of torture (pa-
per by Don Foster). The Foster Report discussed at the workshop 
dealt with detention and torture of detainees. As a result, the is-
sue became public. A debate ensued in various newspapers for some 
weeks. The Minister of Law and Order at the time, Louis le Grange, 
found it necessary to react personally to Don Foster and Stellenbosch 
academics who publicly defended the “Torture report”. In the ensu-
ing media debate, loyal National Party supporters tried to discredit 
the report as “politics under the pretence of science”. Nonetheless, 
the debate started. Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) 
hearings subsequently proved that the report may have been “politi-
cal” (biased intervention?) but not devoid of truth.
CIS and SAACI members, as well as Quakers, popularised to some 
extent the notion of non-violent (and careful but qualified biased) 
intervention in a time of increasing communal violence. However, 
intervention was not directed towards a specific political grouping 
in the resistance, but towards those who suffered under an authori-
tarian regime. With reference to the terminology discussed earli-
er, the notion of “biased intervention” implies rather complicated 
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choices and not recipe-like actions as if the socio-political context is 
unchanging. Human conflicts in a material world cannot be demar-
cated in strict and static moments as the South African experience 
then and now informs us.
The members and associates of SAACI remained committed to 
social justice, for instance Loet Douwes Dekker, Jannie Malan, An-
dries Odendaal, Hugo van der Merwe and Ampie Muller. During 
the early stages of transition, the Association and its members did 
not shy away from debates (and involvement) on the role of political 
leadership in transition, the implications of (re)establishment of so-
cial justice, the TRC debates, restitution and various other issues.
HW himself continued to mediate in a less than public role where 
necessary, persistently facilitating communication while denounc-
ing any violent solution to conflict in South Africa, even if the reality 
of a violent struggle could not be ignored or wished away.
11. Conclusion
Before I conclude, let me share some reflective notes with the 
reader while mindful that space and time restrictions do not 
allow a “full audit” by the author. I meant to write up this study 
long ago to honour the influence both HW and Slabbert among 
others have had on my political views but various other projects 
delayed the finalisation. One could have done more in this study, 
I admit. I pointed out that interviews with various people who 
worked closely with HW would have added value and hopefully 
other researchers would take up such studies. I probably under-
emphasised the future relevance of HW’s approach and how 
his and those of IDASA can play a constructive role in future 
South Africa and the region. But again, this leaves room for 
other scholars and researchers to act upon. If this article at least 
reminded us about the role that social scientists can play to 
alleviate social maladies, I shall be content regardless of criticisms 
raised by peers and colleagues.
Conflict is universal and in certain instances even healthy. How-
ever, violent and destructive conflict bleeds societies to death. 
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Inter- and intrastate conflict can be remedied in the short term by 
means of oppression, civil war and extermination. There is, however, 
a non-negotiable: the violent way springing from “force is the way 
of the world” is not preferable, not even negotiable, when the vision 
of a humane and just society is at stake and people choose to and are 
left with no other option but to act against violent impositions on a 
day-to-day basis.
When unequal opposing political powers meet, conflict with 
potentially destructive results can be resolved in various ways. Two 
of these were touched upon in this article: one being partisan inter-
vention, a route followed by IDASA and others and another being 
through committed but non-partisan intervention. HW followed 
the latter. In retrospect, these approaches were complementary but 
to a large extent independent from each other.
Years later, others are rather opportunistically suggesting that 
they paved the way not only in achieving a negotiated settlement 
but also in initiating “talks-about-talks” and transitionary arrange-
ments. Among them are Stellenbosch intellectuals, prominent ex-
Broederbonders and National Intelligence staff members. These are 
interesting claims, considering that they were not involved on the 
side of the disenfranchised in the 1960s and 1970 – rather the con-
trary. Arguably, they may have acted as latecoming facilitators of 
communication and as go-betweens, but by far not pioneers in the 
field such as HW and advocacy groups such as IDASA, however dif-
ferent the approaches between CIS and IDASA.
As far as the contributions made by HW and an institute such 
as IDASA are concerned, both approaches contributed in turning 
South Africa away from a violent civil conflict/war that could have 
lasted for many years and that could have led to the death of South 
African politics and a Pyrrhic victory for whoever may have ended 
up in power. Both approaches provide “lessons learnt” to other coun-
tries on the continent (and perhaps the globe) that may lead to posi-
tive replicable experiences. 
One cannot deny that partisan intervention can frequently steer 
conflict towards stability and order as well as better outcomes for the 
Acta Academica 2011: 43(1)
34
parties initially involved in such violent conflict. However, partisan 
intervention frequently has unintended consequences.16 One may 
argue that the time has come for committed non-partisan interven-
tion in African conflicts and/or regional/continental reconstruction. 
This may or may not coincide with partisan intervention, which may 
run parallel and independent of non-partisan mediation.
The above holds relevance today for South(ern) Africa and Af-
rica – and even wider. It appears that South Africa (and considering 
tensions in the sub-region and the rest of the continent) is entering 
a stage again where neutral mediators and partisan interveners are 
needed to steer the country, region and continent towards social jus-
tice, principled non-racialism and the deepening of democracy in 
state and society. Any volunteers out there?
16 The one-sided interventions by the USA under Bush (jnr) and its “Coalition of 
the Willing” interventions in the (Middle) East had destabilising consequenc-
es, which are still being and will be felt with predictable negative outcomes in 
the future. 
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